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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
1 CORPORATION, 
·k·\·1 Ynrk Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
SALT LAKE COUNTY, et al. , 
Defendants. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, et al., 
Cross-claimants, 
-vs-
THE STATE TAX COMMISSION 
OF UTAF, et al. , 
Cross-defendants. 
Case No. 18972 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS/CROSS-APPELLANTS 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff, Kennecott Copper Corporation sued Defendant 
Salt Lake County, the Utah State Tax Commission and others for 
partial refund of Plaintiff's 1981 property taxes previously 
paid under protest. Plaintiff's theory of recovery was that a 
recently enacted State Statute requiring County valuation to 
include recognition of certain expenses resulted in property 
1·aluPd by the County bPing assessed a proportionately lower tax 
than State valued properties. Plaintiff, believing such 
differences in valuation to be ur.constitutinnal, prnyPc1 that 
court proportionately reduce Plaintiff's prnpertj' ass0ssm0nt 
refund the difference. 
Defendant, Salt Lake County d0n1ed sud1 allP<Jatiur 
and filed a counterclaim assPrtinq that the current State 
valuation techniques do not fulfill the constitutional mandat' 
found at Article XIII, Section 3, which requires all property 
be valued at an a.mount equal to its value in money. This 
Defendant alleged the valuation techniques used by thP Ti'!x 
Commission resulted in much nf Plaintiff's property being 
underassessed and allowed significant property of Plaintiff 
escape valuation all together. 
Defendant, Salt Lake County filed a cross-claim 
against the Utah State Tax Commission asserting similar alle-
gations as those stated above as well as demanding review of 
certain assessment records of the Tax Commission. 
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Tax Division of the Third Judicial District Court 
the Honorable Judge Philip A. Fishler, presiding, entered a 
memorandum decision after hearing cross motions for a Summar'.· 
Judgment and Motion to Dismiss. Judge Fishler ruled against 
Plaintiff's claim that the State valued properties were uncon-
stitutionally over-assessed. The Court granted the motions o' 
both the Plaintiff and Defendant, Utah State Tax Cnm.rrissicn ,. 
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dismiss the respective counterclaim and cross-claim filed by 
oPfendant, Salt Lake County. The Court held the Defendant, Salt 
County did not have the requisite standing to maintain the 
la1ms 8gainst the individual parties. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant Salt Lake County seeks reversal of the Trial 
Court's finding that the County was without standing to maintain 
its claims against the above mentioned parties. That the County 
be given the opporrunity to prove by way of its counterclaim 
that plaintiff's property is underassessed and has escaped 
assessment. The appellant further prays that the Court find 
those valuation techniques used by the State Tax Commission to 
assess plaintiff's property be found not to fully measure the 
cash value of such property and that other methods be used to 
re-assess plaintiff's property for all years which Utah law 
allows such re-assessments to occur. And finally, appellant 
asks this honorable Court to find that the mining assessment 
book the defendant State Tax Commission is by law required to 
maintain be provided the appellant for its review. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In 1981 the Utah State Legislature enacted a law which 
placed a percentage reduction on properties valued by county 
0ssessors. This law, Section 59-5-4.5, U.C.A. as amended 1953, 
-3-
requires the local assessor to use 80 pPr c,cnt ,,f theo rr,•r,,, +, 
cash value as its assessable cash value. The purposP of 11 1 , 
and the reduction is to achieve equity bv reducing l ocu 1 
ass<"ssed properties towards an assessment level that was 
previously being enjoyed only by State Assessed properties. 
Plaintiff, Kennecott Corporation, is the owner of a 
vast mining operation situated within Salt Lake County (T.R. p4) 
The nature of plaintiff's business requires a majority of its 
property to be valued by the Utah State Tax Commission instead 
of the County Assessor, thereby exempting plaintiff's properties 
from the 80 per cent valuation ceiling. 
Article XIII, Section 11. (T.R. p4). 
Utah Constitution 
Plaintiff Kennecott Corporation paid part of its 1981 
property tax assessment under protest pursuant to Section 
59-11-11, U.C.A. as amended 1953 (T.R. p5). Plaintiff then 
filed the action in the lower Court asking for a refund of the 
amount paid under protest (T.R. p7). In its complaint, plain-
tiff alleges that the newly enacted valuation limitation is 
unconstitutional (T.R. p6). Plaintiff thereby claims that its 
valuation must be proportionately reduced. (T.R. p7). 
The defendant-appellant Salt Lake County filed an 
answer to plaintiff's complaint specifically denying plaintiff's 
allegations (T.R. p44-51). The appellant asserted a 
counterclaim in its answer wherein it alleged that as a result 
of certain underassessments made by the Utah State Tax 
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plaintiff had not paid its required share of 
'f'>'rty taxes. (T.R. p54-5G) The appellant additionally alleged 
1hat rertain properties of plaintiff's had escaped assessment 
entirely. Again resulting in plaintiff not paying its fair and 
equal share of taxes. (T.R. p54-56) The appellant stated 
further that Utah law provides that upon discovery of escaped 
properties, the same may be assessed as far back as five years 
prior. (T.R. p56) 
The appellant also filed a crossclaim naming the Utah 
State Tax Commission as cross defendant. (T.R. p57-64) In said 
crossclaim, the appellant alleges the State Tax Commission to be 
responsible for the valuation and assessment of plaintiff's 
properties. (T.R. p58) It further alleges that the Utah State 
Tax Commission has failed to value plaintiff's properties at 
their full cash value. (T.R. p58-59) The appellant additionally 
"tates that the provisions found in Section 59-5-57, UCA as 
amended 1953, do not establish a value for plaintiff's 
properties equivalent to full cash value and the statutory 
methodology is therefore unconstitutional. (T.R. p59) The 
appellant thereby asks the lower Court to require the Utah State 
Tax Commission to rectify the inequities found in the past 
taxation of plaintiff's properties and to order the State Tax 
Commission to disregard Section 59-5-57, as the prescribed 
method for valuing plaintiff's properties in the future, insofar 
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as that method of valuation nesults in the unrl• 0 rassc·c-srw 111 
escape of plaintiff's property for purpnsPs of taxat101L 
In a Second cause of action against the Utah Stdt0 , 
Commission, the appellant alleges said Tax Commission has 
refused appellant the opportunity to review assessment 
information of mines and other state assessed properties 
including plaintiff's. (T.R. p61-62) Appellant believes that 
such information is required to be maintained by the Utah State 
Tax Commission under Section 59-5-56, U.C.A. as amPnded 1953. 
The appellant then asked the lower Court to require the State 
Tax Commission to maintain such information and to 
require the cross-defendant to allow review of such information 
by the appellant. (T.R. p64) Appellant further contends that it 
needs to know the basis of plaintiff's assessment in order to 
properly defend against plaintiff's claims. 
The plaintiff taxpayer filed a Motion for Judgment on 
the pleadings together with a supporting memoranda asking the 
Court to hold consistently with its allegations. (T. R. p9 5-96, 
plll-121) The defendant Ut2h State Tax Commission later filed? 
Motion for Summary Judgment as to plaintiff's complaint 
supported by a memorandum of points and authorities requestino 
the Court find the subject valuation ceiling constitutional 
(T.R. pl28-129, pl30-208) 
Concurrently with plaintiff's Motion for Judgment 
consistent with its complaint, it filed a Motion tn dismiss the 
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'I s counterclaim. The Motion being filed under Rule 
(IJ) CJf the Utah RulPs of Civil Procedure and was again 
supµorted by a memorandum. (T.R. p98-99, plOl-110) The 
defendant Utah State Tax Commission filed a similar motion and 
memo!:andum concerning appellant's cross-claim. (T.R. p70-72, 
p73-94) 
Plaintiff's supporting memorandum focuses on: a) the 
lack of wrongdoing on the taxpayer's part for the under-
assessrnent, (T.R. pl04); b) the lack of standing held by the 
?ppellant to challenge past assessments of plaintiff's 
properties, (T.R. pl04); c) the assertion of a statute of 
limitations applying expressly to review by the Tax Commission 
instead of the Court as occurred here, (T.R. plOS-106); and, d) 
lack of statutory authority on the part of the lower Court to 
hear matters dealing with the value of plaintiff's property. 
(T. R. pl06-108) 
The memorandum filed by defendant Utah State Tax 
Commission in support of its dismissal motion sets forth similar 
arguments as plaintiff's, including: a) the posture of 
appellants to the State Tax Commission being equivalent to a 
servant-master relationship and appellants thereby lack 
authority to maintain the action, (T.R. p76-81); b) lack of 
necessary standing on the part of the County to maintain the 
cross-claim, (T.R. p81-90); and, c) the mining assessment 
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information sought by the appellants is somehow cnn f id en ti a I 
(T.R. p90-93) 
The appellant responded to the above allegations in 
opposing memorandum answering both the plaintiff's and defendac 
Utah State Tax Commission arguments. (T.R. p300-318) The 
appellant cites a host of Utah decisions similar in facts to 
present controversy which find the County as having the 
necessary standing. (T.R. p304-310) The appellant identifies 
the Utah statutory authority which invests the Utah Tax Court 
with the needed authority to properly adjudicate the 
counterclaims and cross-claims of appellant. The County also 
presented legislative and judicial authority which permits the 
Court to re-assess invalid valuations as far back as five tax 
years. 
The appellant presented evidence which was taken 
Kennecott's own records and which was not denied or qualified b: 
plaintiff, Kennecott, which established that for the year 1981, 
Kennecott paid zero (0) dollars on minerals having a minimum 
value of $436,355,560.00. In 1978, 1979 and 1980, Kennecott 
also paid zero (0) dollars in the face of similar substantial 
mineral production. (T.R. p232-286) 
The affidavit of Robert Yates, chief appraisPr for 
Salt Lake County, which was neither opposed nor refuted, 
indicated there was no acreage within Salt Lake County valued 
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Sl0.00 per acre in 1981. (T.R. p. 220-222) In 1980, 1979 and 
1478 Kennecott owned 10,271.60 acres in Salt Lake County valued 
at $5.00 per acre; and, in 1977, 12,092.60 acres valued at $5.00 
per acre. (T.R. p. 243) 
The plaintiff filed a memorandum replying to the 
appellant's points and authorities. (T.R. p320-331) A response 
from the defendant Utah State Tax Commission was also filed. 
(T.R. p332-341) The appellant then duly filed a response to the 
opposing parties' memoranda. (T.R. p.650-657) 
The Court filed a memorandum decision in this case on 
December 9, 1982. The Honorable Judge Fishler held Section 
59-5-4.5, to be constitutionally valid thereby denying 
plaintiff's refund request. The Court additionally found the 
appellant to lack necessary standing to raise the earlier filed 
counterclaim and crossclaim and therefore dismissed the same. 
The County duly filed a Notice of Appeal from that 
decision thereby bringing its claims before this Court. 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFF TAXPAYER HAS PLACED ITS VALUATION IN ISSUE 
BY FILING THE PRESENT ACTION IN THE LOWER COURT. 
The taxpayer has tried to short-circuit the 
counterclaim of the appellant by positioning its claim for 
relief in a peculiar light. 
The plaintiff insists a refund is owed it because of 
the claimed discrimination resulting from the application of 
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Section 59-5-4.5, U.C.A. as :emerrl0d i'l'J1, hi.1ct· ·'•·t.·· 
procedure used in valuing locally assess0d pt•'·rwrt '/ dt«I 
59-5-57, U.C.A. as amended 1953, whjrh deals with assessn" "' 
mines. This claimed over assessment is due to the> fact 
locally assessed property is being given a equalization 
factor in finding full cash value. The plaintiff asserts this 
same factor should be applied to mining valuation. At the same 
time, in order to dispense with the appellants counterclaim, the 
plaintiff asserts its case is not based on wrongful valuation. 
Plaintiff, by its action, has placed its valuation for thr vear 
1981 into issue. 
The appellant sees no merit to the plaintiff's 
contention outside of attempting to give a forum in which it has 
everything to gain and nothing to lose. By asking for a refund, 
the plaintiff must logically show it has been overassessed. The 
plaintiff is not asserting the tax assessment of its valued 
property was wrongful. It is claiming that compared to local 
valuations, its valuation was excessive. By making this claim 
it inherently puts its actual valuation into dispute. 
The appellant respectfully submits that the plaintit: 
cannot be allowed to position its claim for relief through the 
bent lense which it seeks. Before the court can conclude that c 
refund is owed, the plaintiff must show that its valuation is 
excessive. Plaintiff's valuation for the year in question is 
issue. And defendants, having been sued by plaintiff on 
-10-
t 1nr1 of thP valuf' of plaintiff's property, are entitled to 
· • anJ thdt plaintiff's property has been undervalued 
;iT,d assessment. 
POINT II 
THE UTAH TAX COURT ACT ALLOWS THE TRIAL COURT TO 
DETERMINE THE TPUE CASH VALUE OF PLAINTIFF'S 
PROPERTIES ONCE SUCH ISSUE IS BROUGHT BEFORE IT. 
Plaintiff initiated the jurisdiction of the Tax 
Division of the District Court by petitioning that tribunal to 
determine the proper valuation of plaintiff's properties. Upon 
the filing of such petition, the Court was obliged to decide the 
actual assessment value of such property, whether such valuation 
resulted in a greater or lesser amount than plaintiff's original 
assessment. 
In Consumer's Power Companv v Big Prairie Township, 
County 265 NW2d 182, (Michigan 1978), the utility 
petitioned the Michigan tax Court after the Township assessed 
the subject's Dam at a higher value than earlier valuations 
based on a new assessment technique. Once before the Court the 
County received permission to intervene and requested even a 
greater value be placed on the property for all the tax years in 
question. When the lower Court held with the intervening 
assessment, an appeal was taken. Early in the Court's 
it found the tax Court had a duty, as the Legislature's 
designoted agent for that purpose, to determine the true cash 
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value of the appellant's property. At pl88. As in th0 pr,,sen: 
case, the taxpayer charged that the Court could not 
assessment beyond the initial level in a proceedinq brnuqh1 1 
the taxpayer to have the valuation reduced. As in this Cctsro 
the County raised the issue of under-assessment by and throuab 
its responsive pleadings. In deciding this question, the 
Michigan Court summarizes the state's history pertaining to 
assessment appeals. It found the prior review process gave the 
taxpayer the option of appealing to an equalization board before 
tendering payment or filing a Court action after paying the 
taxes under protest. Only the equalization board had power to 
increase the initial tax. That system was found unworkable 
because both routes could be simultaneously taken by the 
taxpayer resulting in contradicting decisions. Al though the 
jurisdictional language of the Michigan tax Court did not 
expressly specify whether the Court could increase the initial 
assessment, the appellate Court construed the law to include 
such power because the tax Court had assumed the functions of 
both the earlier review devices. 
The powers vested in the tax division of the Utah 
District Courts under the Utah Tax Act, Section 59-24-1, et 
seq., U.C.A. as amended 1953, also provide the lower Court with 
plenary power to increase an initial assessment made by the 
State Tax Commission. 
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Section 59-7-12, U.C.A. as amended 1953, gives the 
,,!J State Tax Commission the power to, " .. correct and increase 
1 nwer any assessment made by it .. " In reviewing the 
decisions of the State Tax Commission, the tax Court may, 
" ... affirm, reverse, modify or remand any order 
of the State Tax Commission, and shall grant 
other relief, invoke such other remedies, and 
issue such orders, in accordance with its 
decisions as shall be appropriate. Section 
59-24-4 U.C.A. as amended 1953." 
As the reviewing Court for the State Tax Commission, 
the Court has de novo review of Commission decisions. Section 
59-24-3, U.C.A. as amended 1953. The Court then, inherently hes 
those powers given the State Tax In addition to the 
powers of the Commission, the Court has those discretionary 
powers cited above. 
As stated in the Consumers Power Case, 
" ... from a statutory and strictly legal point of 
view, the potential for a finding of 
under-assessment came into being, the instant 
consumers took its §152 appeal to the Tax 
Tribunal. From that moment on, the Tax Tribunal 
had the jurisdiction and power to increase the 
contested assessments even if no one had 
appeared in opposition." 
The extensive powers given the Utah Tax Court clearly 
include at least those powers invested in the Michigan Tribunal. 
POINT III 
ONCE APPELLANT PROVES THAT CERTAIN METHODS AND 
APPLICATIONS USED BY THE UTAH STATE TAX 
COMMISSION TO VALUE PLAINTIFF'S PROPERTIES FALL 
SHORT OF CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATES, SAID 
PROPERTIES MUST BE ORDERED BY THE COURT TO BE 
REASSESSED USING CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID 
METHODOLOGIES. 
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The ability to challenge tax valuation methods " ,,. 
the Utah State Tax Commission in collecting taxes in beh" 11' r. 
the County has been shown above to be vested in the counties 
Utah. Yet before this standing has any relevance it must be 
found that a remedy exists which the Court may invoke once the 
County proves the unconstitutionality of the methods used by 
Utah State Tax Commission. The power to sue and the right to 
relief are inseparable. This is especiallv true in the 
constitutional context. 
In Jensen v Byran 40 Cal Rptr 540, 541 (California 
Court of Appeals 1964) Los Angeles County, by oversight, failed 
to assess the improvements of plaintiff's real property apart 
from said property. When found, the County made the necessary 
deferred assessments. Plaintiff taxpayer unsuccessfully 
challenged this deferral. The Court found that California's 
Constitution requires all property within that state to be 
unless an exemption is granted by State Constitution or by 
federal law. Additionally, it found the County had statutory 
authority to make such deferred assessments. 
Utah has similar Constitutional language to that of 
California requiring assessment of all property not exempt by 
said Constitution or by federal law. Article XIII, Section Twr 
The appellant County has shown much of plaintiff's mineral 
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1 11 't inns h,1'/f-2 escaped assessment entirely. Such prcperty is 
,,iJJcct to the deferred assessments required in Jensen. 
In Bauer-Schweitzer Malting Company v City and County 
of San Francisco 506 P2d 1019, 1020-1021 (California 1973), a 
Grand Jury investigation found the County Assessor had committed 
several improprieties in office. A later civil action resulted 
in new valid assessments being ordered on several properties. 
The plaintiff was one of many who was required to pay 
substantial taxes for propert"' which had earlier escaped 
assessment. The higher Court affirmed this action even though 
no fraud or collusion involving the plaintiff was shown to have 
occurred. The Court quoting the lower appellate Court found 
clear. 
"uniform assessments are required and that where 
the applicable assessment ratio has not been 
uniformally applied, escaped assessments must be 
made for all years for which recovery is 
permitted by law, .. 
*** 
.. the Constitution requires that all properties 
subject to taxation shall be assessed at its 
full cash value." 
The public policy behind the Bauer-Schweitzer case is 
In order to achieve constitutionally mandated 
uniformity, all assessable property must be appraised at its 
full cash value. 
Under the present facts, the appellB_nt County has 
shown that much of plaintiff's mineral extraction has escaped 
Assessment entireJy. This fact is unrebutted. No evidence to 
lhe contrarv was presented. The defendant County has also shown 
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through affidavit that much of plaintiff's real pr"pe•rt•· 10. 
grossly undervalued. Although it is tru1• the dcfend.1rt i 11 
Tax Commission has discretion in how it valur•" tl10 µ 1 ()P"' 
tax payer, that valuation must reflect actual cash vcJlu,,, 
Constitution Article XIII, Section three. 
Once the appellant has shown that past valuations of 
plaintiff's property have failed to meet the above 
constitutional criteria, it is apparent that the State Tax 
Commission must then make valid assessments for those 
properties, at least as far back as Utah law allows, which is a 
maximum of 5 years. 
In Hewlett-Packard Company v County of Santa Clara 123 
Cal Rptr 195, 199 (California Court of l\.ppeals 1975), the 
taxpayer had provided all information required by law to the 
assessor. For five years the assessor mistakenly valued much o[ 
the property on a manufacturer cost basis not realizing the 
property was made by the taxpayer and therefor subject to a 
higher assessment under the trade level method. When the 
mistake was found addi tiona 1 assessments were made for those 
years. The Court action followed. The taxpayer asserted such 
escaped assessments may be had only if caused by the wronadoing 
of the assessor. The Court held otherwise quoting Excell-0 
Corporation v County of Alameda 107 Cal Rptr. 839 (1973), 
Bauer-Schweitzer establishes that propert'.' must 
be assessed uniformally, that uniformity must he 
accomplished even though there has heen cin 
earlier assessment, where the assessment was too 
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low, and that an underassessment cannot be 
susti:iined althouoh all parties acted in good 
faith. (emphasis added by Court) 
The application of this Court's holding to the present 
'acts is direct. Even though both the assessor and taxpayer 
believed each was acting in conformance with law, once it is 
shown constitutional requirements of uniformity and valuation at 
full cash value have not been attained such property must be 
re-assessed. 
The appellant has already shown that significant 
portions of plaintiff's property escaped assessmFnt or is 
seriously undervalued. All such properties must be re-assessed 
so as to achieve the required uniformity. 
POINT IV 
UTAH COUNTIES HAVE CONSISTENTLY ENJOYED JUDICIAL 
STANDING TO MAINTAIN ACTIONS AGAINST THE UTAH STATE 
TAX COMMISSION WHEN THE PROPRIETARY INTERESTS OF THE 
COUNTY ARE AT STAKE. 
The Utah State Tax Commission is given a peculiar mix 
of responsibilities. Looking at those duties involving property 
tax assessment, the Commission has essentially two functions. 
The first involves hearing local taxpayer appeals taken from the 
individual County Equalization decisions. See Section 59-7-10, 
U.C.A. as amended 1953. This function also includes equalizing 
the value of properties between counties, aiding and supervising 
the county assessors in executing their local taxing duties, 
''r0anizing conventions of county assessors for the discussion of 
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tax problems in the State, and to requirP Cntlnt-:,· i\tt-nrnc" 
institute needed leaal artions to enforce tn1' t"': l""r :r· 
areas. Se<" Section 59-5-4fl(8)toll7). 
The Utah State Tax Commission's other funct: ion 1 s th 
of valuing, assessing and apportioning to the counties, thar 
property which by law the Commission is charged with assessing, 
Se<" Section 59-5-3 U.C.A. as amended 1953. Within this 
function, the taxes generated by the Commission's work belong ,, 
the counties. It is a county tax. The Commission merely 
determines the value. This duty of the Tax Commission is 
different from its management function in that it is working :o, 
the counties sole benefit. The Tax Commission is the fiduciary 
agent of the counties in executing this task. 
The counties perform a similar role for their local 
taxing districts. This fiduciary obligation was recognized b\' 
this Court in the recent case of The Board of Education of the 
Granite School District v. Salt Lake County No. 17175, filed 
February 8, 1983. As in the present case, no specific statuton· 
language exists which gives the taxing districts standing to 
challenge the counties actions 
duty. This Court found that a 
in executing their collection 
fiduciary obligation existed 
between the units due to the nature of the relationship. A 
result contrary to the public interest would occur here if the 
County was without power to question the Utah State Tax 
Commission's actions when operating in its fiduciary mode ;r: 
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and in behcilc of the county .. The ability to challenge the 
",f,, I ness r•f the Tax Commission's valuation methods becomes 
,., i1tial when nc,ting thi'lt the property which the Commission 
1 dXPS is one of the largest, single revenue sources the 
1pp,dlant has. An underassessment of the plaintiff 
substantially damages many essential County programs. The tax 
revenues collected from the plaintiff are for the sole use and 
benefit of the appellant and its various taxing entities. The 
appellant could not meet its public responsibility without these 
funds. Appellant must therefore have the power to question the 
results of the Tax Commission's fiduciary actions in behalf of 
the County. 
The County appellant is not attempting by this action 
to obtain a vnluation technique that simply produces more 
revenue. The County wants equity. The County wants equality. 
Nothing more--nothing less. Case law is rampant with authority 
that holds the Utah State Tax Commission to have discretion in 
which of many lawful valuation techniques it chooses. The 
County is asserting that defendant Tax Commission is not fully 
performing its function in that plaintiff's properties are not 
being valued at their full cash value. If the County is 
prevented from questioning these valuations, it will be left 
without a remedy and only the discretion of the Utah State Tax 
Commission will determine what revenue the County will receive. 
Thf" unr!ervalued taxpayer certainly will not challenge the 
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undervaluation and if the County is precluded ttTn- .-!1;1] 1,, ,. 
the Commission, the public would likewisP b,, 
using the courts as a remedy. Who then will be the lva+,·h 
Not the Tax Commission, nor the underassessed property ovmer 
Without the tools of enforcement, the Cons ti tutione.l and 
statutory standards of equity and of valuing plaintiff's 
property at cash value is meaningless. Such a result would bP 
inconsistent with the very purpose of setting such boundaries. 
The lower Court refused the appellant standing tho 
basis of cases handed down in Washington and Colorado. The 
Trial Court stated the Utah authority cited and discussed by 
appellant dealt with procedural matters over which the County 
and State held concurrent jurisdiction. 
A review of the cases relied on by the Trial Court in 
declining to judicially recognize the County right to question 
the assessment and the Tax Commission assessment practic<"s 
illuminated the difference of functions given to the State Tax 
Commission and the resultant mistake made by the lower Court in 
not recognizing this difference. 
In Board of County Commissioners of the County of 
Dolores v. Love 470 P2d 861, 862 (Colorado 1970), the plaintiff 
therein was attemptinq to challenge the State Tax Commission's 
review and reappraisal of properties earlier valued by the 
County Assessor. The County initially assessed the propertv 
was represented in the administrative review. Pelying 
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thn Dillon doctrine, the Court found the County was without the 
,i, ii st 1nclcn0 to judicicilly challenge the Board's supervisory 
l"<"1sion. ThPse facts fnll squarPly within the above mentioned 
i:cview function of the Utah State Tax Commission versus its 
fiduciary function. The present facts involve the tax 
nssessment functions of the Tax Commission, not its supervisory 
role. Further, as discussed below, this Court has previously 
expelled the Dillon Rule as a delegating source of County 
pnwers. 
For the same reasons, the case of Adams County Board 
of Commissioners v. Union Pacific Railroad Companv 525 P2d 1201, 
1204 (Colorado 1974), cannot be used to prevent the appellant 
from challenging the actions of the State Tax Commission. The 
Adams County Court adopted the Love decision in toto as its 
basis tor the affirmance. 
In Pettit v. Board of Tax Appeals 538 P2d 501, 502 
(Washington 1975), the facts again involved the local assessor's 
valuation being contested by the taxpayer. Again the County's 
interests were represented at the appeal before the State Board 
of Equalization. Only after a decision in favor of the taxpayer 
did the assessor attempt review in the Courts. 
Here, the County has had no voice in the process which 
determined the amounts of revenue it alone is entitled to. 
If standing is denied the County defendant here, its 
,charges concerning the Tax Commission's valuations will never be 
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heard. The County will be relegated to a position in which it 
takes whatever revenue the Tax Commission dPciclPs tc, 'Jl ,,, 
notwithstanding the fact that there exists a Const 1 tl!t:, "" 
mandate of a 20% assessment of the plaintiff's full cash valu. 
of its property. 
The Court in King County v Washington State Board of 
Tax Appeals 622 P2d 898 (Washington 1981) ,was presented similar 
facts as those found in Pettit. Again the County Assessor 
appraised the property of taxpayer. The local assessment was 
appealed to the Board of Tax Appeals which lowered the 
assessment. The County then filed the action in the Superior 
Court for review. 
Not one of the cases relied on by the lower Court in 
dismissing defendant County's claims dealt with the issue 
involved herein. The defendant County at no time valued the 
plaintiff's property and it has never had an opportunity to 
its voice heard by any forum. At the same time, the valuation 
of plaintiff's property is a most important factor to the 
County's budget. The County is the interested party to the 
plaintiff's valuation in that the valuation is for the County's 
benefit. 
The lower Court disregarded several Utah cases brought 
forth by the appellant to show that Utah counties continually 
have had standing to challenge the methods of the Utah State To• 
Commission while operating as the County's tax collector. 
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The early case of Salt Lake County v State Board of 
1 55 P 378, 378 (Utah 1898) holds facts similar in 
, ' 1 11 1' i plP to the present case. There the Tax Conunission under 
its former name of the State Board of Equalization was 
challenged by the County concerning its methods of apportioning 
the earlier made assessment of railroad stock to the various 
counties. There the State Tax Conunission was acting in its 
fiduciary capacity. Similar to the present facts, the County 
1V2s challF?nging the method of apportionment. The Court, after 
examining the existing apportionment method ordered the 
defendant to re-apportion the assessments. It said 
In any event, we have no doubt the Board can 
make a more correct assessment from information 
obtained from the officers of the respective 
roads. (emphasis added) 
The Court focused on what method was fairer to the 
County. The present appellant has previously shown that present 
valuation techniques used by the defendant Tax Conunission do not 
adequately measure full cash value. As done in the earlier 
case, this Court should require a more correct valuation of 
claimants properties. 
The State Tax Conunission's method of apportionment was 
again challenged in Juab County v Bailey et al., 140 P.764, 765 
(Utah 1914). This time it dealt with how the proceeds of a mine 
situated in both Juab and Utah counties were respectively 
apportioned. The Court focused mostly on the timing of the 
County's complaint, not raising the standing issue sua sponte as 
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it did the timeliness one. Noting the attent inn it a2v0 the-
issue of tardiness, it seems like 1 y the Court W()u l d !in' r 
disposed of the case on standing if it had felt such a holdi· 
would be accurate. See also Rich County v Bailey et al 154 2. 
773 (Utah 1916); and Mammouth City v Snow et al 253 P. 680 (Utar, 
1926) . 
A similar fiduciary assessment process by the State 
Tax Commission to the present case was challenged in the more 
contemporary case of Washington County et al v State 'J'ax 
Commission, et al 133 P 2d 564, 567-568 (Utah 1943). There the 
constitutionality and application of a statute exempting those 
portions of electrical utility companies used to pump irrigation 
water was disputed by the plaintiff County. Although the Court 
does not discuss the standing issue directly, it does allow the 
County to challenge the constitutionality of a State Statute, a 
legislative act having more credence than the presently 
challenged administrative acts which execute such authority. 
The County in the present case is asking the Court to 
give it a forum in which it may attempt to show that the 
defendant Utah State Tax Commission is not living up to its 
duties. The only entity having a higher qualification for 
standing is the plaintiff taxpayer. How often will an 
advantaged taxpayer challenge the escape or underassessment of 
its own property? Realistically then, no enforcement tool 
exists if the County is denied standing. If no enforcement 
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exists, no boundaries exist to the discretion of the Utah State 
1·.-i' f_'omrni ss ion. Is it an entity unto itself or must it serve 
tile nc'eds of citizens of the State of Utah? 
The lower Court's dismissal of the defendant's claims 
was based on cases dealing with Court Appeals by the County from 
the review decisions of the various State Tax Commissions. 
Those courts subsequently held that the counties had no standing 
to appeal those review decisions. However, this Court has 
previously held that in this state, the counties have the right 
to even challenge these supervisory decisions. See Countv Board 
of Equalization of Kane County v State Tax Commission 50 P2d 418 
(1935); Baker v Tax Commission 520 P2d 203 (1974); and Salt Lake 
County v Tax Commission 532 P2d 680 (1975). 
Indicative of the legislative intent that Utah 
counties have the needed standing to challenge the methods of 
the State Tax Commission is S.B. 208 which was passed by both 
houses of the 1983 Utah Legislature and signed into law by the 
governor. During the review and debate involved in the creation 
of this law, an amendment was added which specifically exempted 
the bill's effect upon the present action. As a strong signal 
of the historic intent of the Utah State Legislature, this 
amendment was explicitly removed from the bill before the bill 
was successfully passed by both houses. It therefore 
specifically applies to this case. At the time of passage, the 
Legislature was much aware of the erroneous interpretation of 
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the Trial Court in this case. 
Appellant believes the intcerpretation this c', u1t 
County's standing powers is still needed in orrlPr fnr i 1·,, 
appellant to challenge the methodology of thP Utah Tcix 
Commission. 
POINT V 
THE APPELLANT MAY RAISE THE ISSUE OF PLAINTIFF'S 
UNDERVALUATION THROUGH THF. COUNTERCLAIM DEVICE. 
In dismissing the appellant's claim against thP 
parties, the lower Court seems to have confused the issue of the 
appellant's standing, with the Court's statutory authority to 
increase the plaintiff's initially assigned assessment. 
Contrary to the lower Court's memorandum decision, the 
Consumer's Power Company opinion did not decide whether the 
intervening County had the ability to judicially challenge the 
taxpayers assessment. The Michigan opinion only discussed the 
valuation method which best determined the true cash value of 
the utility and whether a greater assessed valuation than that 
set by the assessing authority could be levied by the tax court. 
supra, pl85. This misunderstanding of the Consumer's Power 
decision holding led the lower Court in the present action to 
misconstrue the statutory authority it has in reviewing orders 
of the State Tax Commission. The importance of this issue to 
the appellant and to the tax Court can f'.Ot be overst.:iter'. an•' 
requires reversal of the lower Court's decision. 
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Due to tlv• .:>.bsence of language in current Utah 
' r' rit res authorizing the County to appeal a Utah State Tax 
"'n"" valuation, the County must be found to have the 
1 l i ty to challenge the taxpayer's assessment through a 
counterclaim once the property owner puts its valuation at 
issue. In Pima Countv v Cyprus-Pima Mining Company 579 P2d 
1081, 1083 (Arizona 1978) the Court held that the County could 
not question the valuation of the taxpayer except in the manner 
provided by law. There, an open pit copper mine's assessment 
was appealed by the taxpayer to the State Board of Tax Appeals. 
Not satisfied with the result, the mine owner pursued its appeal 
through the Courts. In its responsive pleading, the County 
affirmatively asserted that the valuation should be increased. 
The Court found since the County had not pursued its statutory 
right to appeal the decision of the Administrative Board, it 
could not do so though an affirmative defense. Arizona law 
specifically provides that a County may appeal a decision of the 
Tax Board. See A.R.S. Section 42-123 (B) (7), and 42-151 (c). 
Conversely, Utah law specifically finds only the taxpayer may 
initiate a judicial challenge to an assessment of the State Tax 
Commission. See Section 59-11-11, U.C.A. as amended 1953. Once 
the judicial determination of valuation has been triggered by 
the taxpayer the County must be allowed to do more than defend a 
valuation which it had nothing to do with, has no records 
-ovnrinq the basis for the assessment, and often cannot support. 
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The Pima County Court's explnnution fo1 h,-,Jrli1,, 1 
that the County did have the right to initiate "" ,1pp<'l 
review of the taxpayer's valuation but did not do llt"'1\1 
counties do not have the statutory authority to begin a Judie' 1 • 
review of the State Tax Commission's valuation. To protect 
their revenue they must at least have the ability to prove to 
the Court a taxpayer's true assessment once the taxpayer has 
asked the Court to determine the true cash value of its 
property. 
To find that the valuation initially assigned a StatP 
assessed taxpayer is the maximum valuation amount it will be 
forced to accept creates a tremendously litigious atmosphere for 
this class of taxpayer. Litigation is encouraged, even invited. 
The taxpayer is given a no lose forum in which to bring its 
assessment. Coordinately, the County is held to the devastating 
legal expense of defending every such action only to obtain an 
assessment amount which even if successful may be well below 
that which it can prove to be the actual valuation. Such a 
result could not have been the intent of the authors of Section 
59-11-11, nor can it be tolerated realizing the contemporary 
financial burden of Utah's Counties. 
As a prerequisite to the plaintiff's obtaining 
jurisdiction under the Tax Court Act, it must pay the originallv 
assessed tax amount under protest and then ask the lower Cnurt 
to find the actual assessment of the property. The purpose 
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1'0hind thr' protest requirement is to alert all entities 
,,,, ernPd tl1cit ownership of those funds is disputed and the 
court might order their refund to the taxpayer. 
Here, the plaintiff taxpayer complied with the protest 
requirement. All entities were alerted to the contingency of 
thosA funds. The appellant County can now challenge the 
valuation by counterclaim using the taxpayer 1 s earlier protest. 
If successful, the County will be entitled to a amount of 
revenue than it originally was apportioned. If unsuccessful the 
taxpayer's protest has prevented all concerned entities from 
unduly relying on these funds. 
No procedural or subs tan ti ve reason exists which 
prevents the County from enjoying the right to prove the 
taxpayer's actual valuation once the taxpayer has asked the Tax 
Court to decide this question. Equity and the Utah Constitution 
requires that this be allowed. 
The taxpayer in the lower action named the appellant 
County as a defendant. The mining company must have believed 
the appellant to be an indispensable party to this action. Once 
the appellant was named a defendant, it had the duty, right and 
opportunity to act in a manner consistent with its general 
welfare. Both the taxpayer and the State Tax Commission alleged 
that the County is barred from raising a valuation counterclaim 
because no specific statutory authority exists which bestows 
this riqht upon it. In State v Hutchinson 624 P2d 1116, 1118 
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(Utah 1980), this Court rli scussed the alJclitv rd n 11nt 
establish an ordinance in furtherance of tlw cc•mmun i "" ,, 
safety, and welfare even though the State had nut qrant ... i LI, 
locality the specific statutory authority to create such an 
ordinance. The well-known Dillon Rule is the invalidatil'c; 
source which had traditionally required specific delegation of 
rule making authority. This Court said, 
"The rule requiring strict construction of the 
powers delegated by the Legislature to counties 
and municipalities is a rule which is archaic, 
unrealistic and unresponsive to the current 
needs of both State and Local governments and 
effectively nullifies the legislative orant of 
general police powers to the counties." 
Later, this Court cited with approval from the earliec 
case of State v. Stanford 66 P.1061 (1901), 
[T] he Constitution implies a right of local 
self-government to each county, and a right to 
establish a system of county government is 
expressly recognized and enjoined. The power is 
given to create the county government, not to 
administer to such a system when created. The 
right of the Legislature was to provide for and 
put in action, not to run and operate, the 
machinery of the local government to the 
disenfranchisement of the people. People v 
Hurlbut, 24 Michigan 44, 9 am. Rep. 103. 
Granted the Hutchinson case dealt not with the power 
of a county to seek its legal level of tax revenue, but with the 
power to legislate a campaign funding ordinance. However, the 
principles set forth in that case are at least as applicable to 
a county securing its just revenue as they are to local 
legislation. 
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The Statc0 Tax Commission has absolutely no intP.rest in 
1 ix rc-"Jc ntcP clc'ri VPcl Erom the properties it assesses for the 
·nurity. ln this function, it does not serve as a board of 
supP. rv is ion to the County. While serving in this manner, it 
works in behalf of the County as a fiduciary. It is the 
County's trustee .. 
To find that the County appellant does not have the 
minimal power to raise by counterclaim alone the true valuation 
of a taxpayer assessed by the State Tax Commission is to hold 
that the Co1mnission is utterly above the law. The taxpayer 
CPrtainly will not bring the under-assessments to light. 
Relying on the reputations of the individual State Tax 
Commissioners to guide their assessment decisions has never been 
a resource which can replace the judicial forum. In sum, the 
County must have the ability to prove a larger assessment exists 
if the system is to function in balance. 
Consideration should also be given to the absence of 
harm crP.ated by holding with the appellant's position. Since 
counties could only dispute the valuation after a taxpayer has 
brought its valuation into 'question', no inordinate amount of 
litigation would result. Since the taxpayer will not have a no 
loose situation by bringing its assessment to the Courts, the 
frivolous cases will be reduced. 
The Utah Tax Court Act gives the lower Court the 
necessary authority to increase a taxpayer's assessment once the 
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initial assessment is proven legally inadequAtP. Althouqh nr, 
statutory language exists providing thP appPllant with 
to bring an assessment challenge to the Court, no re>AS•·t• . 
in logic or law which would disallow the appellant tinrn 
attempting to prove a higher assessment value once the taxpayet 
asks the Court to determine its valuation. The lower court's 
decision must therefore be reversed. 
POINT VI 
THE APPELLANT MUST BE ALLOWED ACCESS TO THE 
MINING ASSESSMENT BOOKS REQUIRED BY LAW TO BE 
MAINTAINED BY THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION. 
The lower Court held against the appellant upon their 
cross-claim which sought to compel the Tax Commission to produce 
the mining assessment books required to be maintained by the 
State Tax Commission under Section 59-5-56, U.C.A. as amended 
1953 and deliver the data upon which plaintiff's assessments 
were based. 
Through the discovery process it was found that 
contrary to sta.tute, the Utah State Tax Commission has not 
maintained the assessment book of mines. However, pertinent 
information which would be entered in the mandated record book 
is available to the State Tax Commission. This information has 
been withheld by the Commission from the appellant except for an 
insufficient summary earlier provided through discovery. 
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The 1983 Legislative General Session held in March of 
generated S.B. 184. This bill was passed by both houses 
,r,d by the Governor soon thereafter. This law requires 
l he State Tax Commission to allow County review of the 
intormation which normally would be found in the mining 
assessment book. 
This newly enacted legislation obviously nullifies the 
need for this Court tn interpret the appellant's rights in this 
regard. More importantly, this legislation should be 
interpreted to back up this Court's recent holdings which 
provides Utah counties with more autonomy in handling their 
ever-increasing complex problems. The counties must have, and 
are receiving more of the management powers needed to deal with 
these responsibilities and any decision of this Court should be 
consistent with that philosophy. 
POINT VII 
THE TAX COURT IS EMPOWERED TO ORDER A VALID 
ASSESSMENT OF ALL PROPERTIES OF TAXPAYERS WHICH 
HAVE ESCAPED LAWFUL ASSESSMENT WITHIN THE PAST 
FIVE TAXING YEARS. 
The appellant has asked the lower Court to order the 
valid assessments of those properties of plaintiff which have 
escaped valid assessment within the past five tax years. The 
power to order such assessment is found at Section 59-5-17, 
11.C.A. as amended 1953. It states 
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"Any property discoverPd by th•" i\s:-cPssor tr, 
have escaped asspssment may be z1::_;:=-,, ,;s1'<l ,1t 
time as far back as five yeors prinr tc• tlH> t1n1• 
of discovery, .. . 11 
This authority is specifically not limited tc l• l-< 
assessors and this Court has previously ruled that this law is 
available to assessments made by the Utah State Tax Commissirin. 
In Union Portland Cement Company v Morgan County 23C 
P.1020, (Utah 1924), the taxpayer's property was 0f the type 
assessed by the State Board of Equalization (The forerunner or 
the State Tax Commission). The plaintiff thPre had filPd its 
affidavit of property ownership and duly paid the assessed tax. 
Later in the year the Board discovered the property affidavit to 
be insufficient in that additional property existed which had 
not been included in the taxpayer's statement. The Board valued 
and assessed the property and the taxpayer later paid the 
additional tax under protest and filed the Court action. In its 
complaint, the plaintiff asserted that once the Board had 
performed its duty, the Board could not raise the assessments on 
the basis of error. the Court found, 
" ... it is quite immaterial for what reason 
property was omitted from the assessment roll. 
The only question is: was it omitted? and, if 
it was, it is the duty of the assessor (in this 
case, the Board of Equalization) to assess it." 
Clearly then, the State Tax Commission may assess all 
property of the taxpayer which has escaped assessment within the 
past five years. The Tax Court, with its reviewina pnwers ovP1 
the State Tax Commission may require that i'1dministrative body L' 
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perform :ts legally mirndated job, including the assessment of 
The property of a taxpayer which has been 
underassessed in the same five year period may also be required 
to undergo a valid assessment. The question of whether 
re-assessment by valid means of previously under-assessed 
property may also fall within the five year statute of 
limitations was discussed in Mammoth City v Snow, et al., 253 
P.680, 684 (Utah 1926). This case principally dealt with the 
proper assessment and apportionment of the mining properties of 
defendant. The owner of several mines had reported its net 
proceeds without designating from which mining property they 
came. This resulted in the plaintiff municipality believing 
that it had not been apportioned its fair share of the tax 
revenue. This Court found the defect not significant enough to 
call for a re-assessment. It said 
" .. [this defect] does not justify us in 
regarding such assessments as a nullity and 
directing the Board to now make an assessment as 
though none had been made. We have no 
allegations er proof that the assessment which 
was made was fraudulently, or based on a gross 
or any undervaluation, and no proof that such or 
any net proceeds of such mines or mining claims 
were omitted from assessment, or that they 
escaped assessment or taxation. (emphasis added) 
This Court rightfully found that an undervaluation is 
as legally inadequate as no valuation at all. Therefore, those 
properties of the plaintiff which were undervalued are just as 
invalid as those properties escaping assessment altogether. 
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The facts of BauPr-Sch\vPitzer Maltina 11, 
City and County of San Fcancisco 506 P2d 1019, 111n (C,4J · 
1973), as set forth fully above, include the ass0ss0r lic'11 ,1 
charged with a variety of improprieties cind much of the 
previously assessed land being re-assessed in a valid manner and 
at its correct value. The plaintiff alleged such re-assessments 
did not fit within the statutory language of "escaping 
assessment," and therefore past tax years could not be examined. 
The Court overturned earlier case law by holding 
"To the extent that property has been assessed 
at an assessment ratio lower than the ratio 
properly established by the assessor for a 
particular year, such property has escaped 
assessment." 
By overturning earlier case law which prevented valid 
re-assessments of land if the same had been earlier assessed in 
any manner, the Court recognized that no difference existed 
between property invalidly assessed and property not assessed at 
all. Constitutionally mandated uniformity of assessment must be 
achieved. Even where the taxpayer was not to blame for the 
underassessment, collecting that revenue actually owed requires 
the taxpayer to do no more than it is socially required to do, 
contributing its fair share to the tax burden. 
Here, much of plaintiff's properties have been shown 
to be severely underassessed or to have escaped assessment 
entirely. The taxes for 1981, are clearly open to re-valuaticr. 
That property which has escaped assessment for the five years 
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, 1nr to thE' 1981 tax year must also now be properly taxed. No 
'-,<'n exists for differef'tiating underassessed property from 
, property. Therefore, all plaintiff's property not 
previously having been fully valued must now be assessed as far 
back as Utah law allows. 
CONCLUSION 
The appellant has always had by law and necessity, the 
judicial standing to challenge the State Tax Commission's 
actions as tax collector. The lower Court under the powers 
given it by the Utah Tax Court Act has the capacity to hear 
issues dealing with the propriety of a taxpayer's valuation, 
determine the correct method of valuation, and require that such 
valuation methodology be applied to the property of taxpayer. 
In the case of property assessed by the State Tax 
Commission, the appellant must have the ability to affirmatively 
prove the valuation of property once the taxpayer has brought 
the issue before the court. To find otherwise is to commit the 
County to an on-going no-win battle and would further bind the 
County to valuations which it had no part of making and often 
cannot support. 
Once improper valuations are found by the Court the 
assessments for the five years preceding such finding may then 
be examined for impropriety. The appellant respectfully 
-37-
requests this Court to reverse the cl0c1sion r,f the J.,vc<>r , 
and to remand this case for a trial on tlw mei it, ,, 1 , 1 
instructions consistent with the points raised hen::111. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 18th day of May, 1983. 
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